

# When Treatment is Defined by Distance: Challenges and Approaches

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## Distance-based Treatments

Many economic phenomena and policies may vary in intensity with geographic distance to a location

A few examples:

- Distance to other firms and productivity spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange 2003, Arzaghi and Henderson 2008, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010, Baum-Snow, Gendron-Carrier, and Pavan 2024)
- Distance to firms and competition: (Ellickson and Grieco 2013, Busso and Galiani 2019, Arcidiacono, Ellickson, Mela, and Singleton 2020, Schiff, Cosman, and Dai 2023)
- Distance to pollution: (Currie, Greenstone, and Moretti 2011, Currie, Davis, Greenstone, and Walker 2015)
- Distance to transit: (Billings 2011, Gupta, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Kontokosta 2022, Jerch, Barwick, Li, and Wu 2024)
- Distance to foreclosures: (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2011, Anenberg and Kung 2014, Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen, and Yao 2015)

## Identifying distance-based treatment effects

One strategy to identify the treatment effect is to compare regions closer to the treatment location to regions further away

However, this raises several related questions:

1. How close is “close enough” to be treated? How far is “far enough” to be a control?
2. How does the effect of treatment vary (ex: decay) with distance? Linearly? Exponentially? Concave? Convex?
3. The set of potential untreated units (controls) may be much larger than treated units (the area of a circle increases quadratically with distance to center). Should we only use a subset of the controls? How to select these?

What if treatment varies with distance, but nearby units are *not* good controls?

## This talk

In my own research and when advising my students, I've struggled with all of the questions.

Today I will discuss some of these issues from my own experience and discuss possible solutions, a few from my work, but mostly from the literature.


I'm focusing on cases where we think the treatment effect varies continuously with distance from a location (a point, or small area); for discussion of Spatial RDD see (Keele and Titiunik 2015)

My emphasis is on identification strategies and I won't talk at all about inference (ex: spatially correlated errors (Conley 1999))

My working example will be the case of point data but the intuition applies to areal data (regions: counties, census tracts, 街道)


## Working example: incumbent restaurants' response to entry

- A number of restaurants exists in a small town in an equilibrium state




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
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
- A number of restaurants exists in a small town in an equilibrium state
- Suddenly, a new restaurant enters the market
- How will the existing restaurants respond? Will they change prices? Will they change products?
- How can we estimate the entry effect on the existing (incumbent) restaurants?






## Estimating the response to entry

- Customers have to travel to restaurants (ignore 外卖)




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
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
## Estimating the response to entry

- Customers have to travel to restaurants (ignore 外卖)
- This travel cost may allow for local market power in the restaurant market and...
- implies that the effect of new competition may *vary with distance*
- Therefore, we can compare restaurants close to the entrant with those further away to estimate the entry response




## Distance buffers

- One common estimation strategy is to assume a treatment buffer: all restaurants within distance  $d$  are treated




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
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## Distance buffers


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- But how do we know  $d = 0.1$ ?
- Why not  $d = 0.2$ ?






## Which units are controls?

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
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## Which units are controls?

- Setting a distance buffer implies that all restaurants outside the buffer are non-treated, but are these all controls?
- Units far away may no longer be “similar,” requires restricting controls to within a given distance of treatment location
- What if good control units are not a function of distance to the treated location?



# Using Nearby Units as Controls: Framework and Method from Butt JUE Insight 2023

## Butts 2023: Spatial DiD

A nice paper from Butts (2023) considers these issues for the case when control units are distributed as a function of distance to the treatment location

Following Butts, consider a unit  $i$  located at  $(x_i, y_i)$  that is treated by an event (ex: entry) located at  $(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$  which occurs between periods  $t = 0$  and  $t = 1$ .

The outcome of  $i$  in period  $t$  is:  $Y_{it} = \mu_i + \tau(Dist_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \lambda(Dist_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \epsilon_{it}$

The  $\tau(Dist_i)$  term is the treatment effect while the  $\lambda(Dist_i)$  term represents non-treatment shocks, and is the source of endogeneity

Notice that  $\lambda(Dist_i)$  is interacted with post ( $\mathbf{1}_{t=1}$ ), so the endogeneity is a time-varying effect ( $\mu_i$  captures all invariant effects)

Butts defines average treatment effect as  $\bar{\tau} = E[\tau_i | \tau(Dist_i) > 0]$ , where  $\tau_i$  is the treatment effect for unit  $i$ ; both treatment effect and other shocks depend on distance to treatment event

## Identifying assumption: local parallel trends

Local parallel trends: for a distance  $\bar{d}$ , local parallel trends hold if for all  $d, d' \leq \bar{d}$  it's true that  $\lambda(d) = \lambda(d')$

In other words, up to  $\bar{d}$  the non-treatment shock is constant

Strong assumption, but may be reasonable for small distances (more later)

Butts points out that “local parallel trends” implies “average parallel trends” (our usual assumption for DiD):


Average parallel trends: for a pair of distances  $d_t$  and  $d_c$ , it is true that  $E[\lambda_d | 0 \leq d \leq d_t] = E[\lambda_d | d_t \leq d \leq d_c]$

*Note:* average parallel trends allows for  $\lambda_d$  to vary with distance, as long as the average value is equal for treated and control units.

Local parallel trends requires it be constant:  $\lambda_d = \lambda, \forall d < \bar{d}$


## Importance of treatment and control distances

- If both treated and control units are within  $\bar{d}$ —the area where lambda is constant—then the endogeneity simply differences out



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
- If both treated and control units are within  $\bar{d}$ —the area where lambda is constant—then the endogeneity simply differences out
- Notice that it's important controls aren't too far away: it must be that  $d_c < \bar{d}$






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- Notice that it's important controls aren't too far away: it must be that  $d_c < \bar{d}$
- And important that  $\lambda$  is a simple function of distance
- But what if you don't know the true  $d_t$  (solid blue) and used a different distance (dashed purple)?



## Unknown treatment distance $d_t$

If you set the distance  $d_t$  to be too large then you assign some control units to the treatment group, thus diluting (attenuating) the effect of treatment (since these units have zero effect by assumption)

If you set distance  $d_t$  to be too small, then some control units are actually treated, also leading to bias

- Butts notes that if treatment is decreasing in distance, this can lead to an *upward* bias since the remaining treated units have a stronger treatment (closer to treatment location)
- If treatment is constant within distance (or varies non-monotonically) this could lead to downward bias

Assuming *average* parallel trends requires knowing the treatment distance.

What to do when treatment distance is unknown?

## One ad-hoc approach: an exclusion buffer

Sometimes we don't know how far the treatment distance extends, but we do know an area that should be treated: we know a  $d_{b1}$  such that  $d_{b1} < d_t$

If we are further willing to state a distance  $d_{b2}$  past which all units must be controls,  $d_c < d_{b2}$ , then we can use an “exclusion buffer” (my term)


We then compare treated units where  $d < d_{b1}$  to control units where  $d_{b2} < d$  and exclude all units between  $d_{b1}$  and  $d_{b2}$  from the regression

The estimated effect is no longer the effect for all treated units—it's a LATE—but it is an unbiased (under these assumptions) estimate of treatment for units within  $d_{b1}$

We used a version of this in Schiff, Cosman, Dai (2023) to look at incumbent restaurant responses to entry


## Exclusion buffer illustration

- We don't know the true distance  $d_t$  (blue)




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
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- We don't know the true distance  $d_t$  (blue)
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## Multiple ring approach

A more systematic approach is to use multiple rings to estimate treatment effects at different distances, which can be interpreted as a non-parametric estimate of  $\tau(Dist)$

This is common in literature, but the number of rings and the maximum distance from the treatment location can be ad-hoc

Butts shows that as long as the true (and unknown) treatment distance  $t_d$  is less than the control distance  $d_c$  specified by the researcher, then it's possible to identify the treatment effect *under local parallel trends*


Basic idea: estimate  $L$  equal width rings between the treatment location and control distance  $d_c$

Within the last ring where  $d_t < d_L < d_c$ , the treatment effect must be zero, leaving only  $\lambda$  (given local parallel trends).

Thus by comparing the treatment effect of all previous  $L - 1$  rings to the last ring  $L$ ,  $\lambda$  is differenced out and the true treatment effect can be estimated within each ring


## Identifying treatment effect with last ring

- In the last ring (last purple dashed line to orange  $d_c$ ) the treatment effect is zero, thus only  $\lambda$  remains




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
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- The second ring mixes treated and control units and will give a smaller estimate (both because treatment declines from the first ring, and some units are not treated)
- Within the third ring there are only control units, thus the estimated effect should be zero



## Linden and Rockoff 2008

In the US, a federal law known as “Megan’s Law” require sex offenders (people convicted of a sex crime) to register their location in a public database (even after serving jail time)

Linden and Rockoff estimate the effect of distance to a known sex offender on housing prices

They define treated houses as those within 0.1 miles of the offender and control houses as 0.1 to 0.3 miles


Butts re-examines their results and suggests that the DiD approach misses substantial heterogeneity, with close houses having a much larger price decline than houses further away, but still within 0.1 miles

To show this, he non-parametrically estimates the treatment effect at different distance bins (rings)

# Butts approach to Linden and Rockoff 2008

Butts estimation of effect from Linden and Rockoff, AER (2008)

(b) Nonparametric Approach



Importantly, the ring coefficients level off to zero; otherwise hard to argue that  $d_t < d_c$

Further, if they level off it suggests (but does not prove) that trends within each ring are roughly similar across distance ( $\lambda_d = \lambda$ )

*Note:* this approach does *not* estimate the ATE, but rather shows the full curve; one could then choose a given distance with which to estimate an average effect

## Choosing the number of rings

A necessary condition is that the number of rings  $L$  has to be large enough so that the treatment effect is zero within the last ring

However, given that this is true, the number of rings chosen could still have a non-trivial effect on the estimated shape of the distance effect

Butts notes that choosing the optimal number of rings is similar to choosing the optimal number of bins in a binscatter diagram, a question addressed in the recent work by Cattaneo et al. AER (2024)

As  $L$  increases, rings become smaller, thus reducing bias of estimate within distance ring; however, smaller rings also have fewer observations, thus increasing the variance (bias-variance trade-off)

Cattaneo et al. suggest choosing bin (ring) count to minimize error; can use their software package *binsreg* (Stata, R, Python) to choose optimal  $L$



## Alternative: estimating changes in a distance gradient

$$Y_{it} = \mu_i + \tau(\text{Dist}_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \lambda_i(\text{Dist}_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Sometimes researchers want to estimate how the distance effect has changed after an event:  $\tau(\text{Dist}_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} - \tau(\text{Dist}_j)\mathbf{1}_{t=1}$  for  $i \neq j$

Consider the case where we have local parallel trends  $\lambda_i(\text{Dist}_i) = \lambda$  for  $d < \bar{d}$  and we want to know how an outcome has changed within a radius less than  $\bar{d}$

We estimate the following *without controls*:

$$Y_{it} = \mu_i + \tau(\text{Dist}_i)\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \lambda\mathbf{1}_{t=1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

We can estimate how the outcomes changes with distance in the post period—the change in gradient—even though the overall treatment effect isn't identified

Consider two points  $i, j$  at different distances and take the first difference (over time) to remove the individual FE.

Then the post period difference between  $i$  and  $j$  is:


$$\Delta Y_i - \Delta Y_j = \tau(\text{Dist}_i) + \lambda - (\tau(\text{Dist}_j) + \lambda) = \tau(\text{Dist}_i) - \tau(\text{Dist}_j).$$

## Distance gradients

- We can estimate the change in the distance gradient for a specific functional form by specifying  $f(Dist)$ , such as linear  $f(Dist) = \beta * Dist$  or quadratic  $f(Dist) = \beta * Dist^{-2}$


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
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- Alternatively, we could use the ring method to estimate the shape non-parametrically
- Notice that with the ring method, only  $L - 1$  rings are identified and that all rings must be within the  $\lambda$  area (gray) defined by  $\bar{d}$




## Beijing Road Rationing: Price and Income Gradients

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
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- They note that if “there are no other contemporaneous shocks that affect the price (or income) gradient” then the change is identified
- They find a sharp increase in the *slope* (intercept not identified): housing prices drop more rapidly moving away from a subway station after the driving restrictions



# Model-based controls



## Why are nearby units good controls?

General argument is that within small area (ex: neighborhood), variation in exact location of treatment is random

Ex: stores choose a retail area but exact address depends on vacancies;  
house-buyers choose neighborhood but exact house depends on stock

Idea (first?) used with areal data in Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008), “BRT”, to study job referrals

Authors estimating whether two people,  $i$  and  $j$  are more likely to work in the same location ( $W_{ij}^b = 1$ ), if they live in the same block ( $R_{ij}^b = 1$ ):

$$W_{ij}^b = \rho_g + \alpha_0 R_{ij}^b + \epsilon_{ij}$$

The key is the reference group (ex: block *group*) fixed effect  $\rho_g$ , which captures all location specific factors that could affect work location

Notice that this is essentially an areal version of the local parallel trends: all shocks are common within a small area  $g$

# Baum-Snow et al. AER 2024




FIGURE 1. MAP OF DOWNTOWN TORONTO

*Notes:* Postal codes are outlined by thin lines. Major streets are in black. All postal codes with centroids within the indicated central 75-meter-radius circle are included in the indicated example peer group area.

Authors focus on 75m ring, control for 500m ring

## Evidence in support of a small area strategy

The identification strategy from BRT 2008 has been used by multiple high quality papers

- Ex: Currie, Greenstone, and Moretti (2011), Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011), Anenberg and Kung (2014), Bayer, Mangum, and Roberts (2021), Baum-Snow, Gendron-Carrier, and Pavan (2024)

A nice thing about the method is one can show how correlation of key *observables* is reduced by inclusion of the reference group fixed effect

This not a test of the identification strategy, but does help to persuade readers of validity, just like a balance test for matching

*Note:* in spatial DiD framework, units within  $\bar{d}$  can differ in covariate *levels*, since these are differenced out. However, if one can show that the levels are similar, that provides support that trends should also be similar

# Evidence for Bayer Ross Topa 2008 strategy

TABLE 3  
CORRELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEIGHBORS  
RESIDING ON SAME BLOCK

	SAMPLE: BLOCKS WITH FIVE+ WORKERS IN SAMPLE		
	Unconditional (1)	Conditional on Census Block Group (2)	Conditional on 10 Closest Blocks Reference Group (3)
High school graduate	.182	.040	.021
College graduate	.294	.060	.030
Age 45–59	.051	.008	–.020
Age 35–44	.017	–.004	–.031
Age 25–34	.098	.027	–.005
Single female	.110	.033	.014
Single male	.094	.027	.004
Married female	.080	.005	–.015
Married male	.088	.026	.011
Children	.142	.046	.006
Children 0–5	.046	.019	–.007
Children 6–12	.058	.017	–.017
Children 13–17	.048	.015	–.025
Children 18–24	.064	.022	–.014
Black	.593	.054	.017
Asian/Hispanic	.275	.084	.049

NOTE.—The table reports unbiased estimates of correlation between a series of individual characteristics and the

Col 1 shows correlation between characteristics of individuals  $i$  and  $j$  living in same block; col 2 shows correlation after condition on census block group; col 3 shows correlation after conditioning on 10 closest blocks (alternative reference group)

## When are nearby units *not* good controls?

An important decision in using nearby controls is defining “nearby” ( $\bar{d}$ )

With areal data (ex: census blocks, block groups), there is often not much flexibility since spatial units are predefined

With point data, we can choose  $\bar{d}$ , but even small distances may still be important in some contexts

For restaurant location choice, distances under 1km still matter: think about popular restaurant streets, or locating near a square or park

Moreover, fundamentals may vary with distance from that point (ex: commercial rent, distance to transit)

Rather than local parallel trends, it could be that  $\tau(Dist)$  and  $\lambda(Dist)$  are strongly correlated

# Two ends of 大学路: 800 meters apart, line 10 entrance



West end 大学路



East end of 大学路

## Modeling (reduced form) treatment assignment

Thinking about how treatment is assigned may yield a clearer and more defensible identification strategy

By modeling/predicting treatment, one can then compare two locations with equal likelihood of treatment, but one received treatment due to purely idiosyncratic factors

The strong assumption one has to make is that all factors determining treatment are controlled for; conditional on modeled treatment likelihood, treatment assignment is random (conditional mean independence)

However, (in my opinion) local parallel trends is equally strong but less explicit because the source of endogeneity is not stated—what are the components of  $\lambda$ ?

*Note:* Even when using local parallel trends, modeling treatment can help one to select appropriate covariates for BRT-type balance test

## ATE or Average Treatment on the Treated?

Another benefit of modeling treatment assignment is it forces the researcher to consider what is being estimated

In spatial DiD framework, we defined the ATE as  $\bar{\tau} = E[\tau_i | \tau(Dist_i) > 0]$

However, treatment location is rarely random and often we only see specific types of locations receiving treatment

Ex: In Ellickson and Grieco (2013) they estimate effect of Walmart entry on supermarkets using a ring approach

Authors note that since they only know locations Walmart chose, estimated effect is average treatment on treated (ATET)

“Without modeling (as opposed to controlling for) the selection of locations, we cannot predict the impact of Wal-Mart’s entry in locations that are vastly different from the ones it has entered so far (e.g. a Wal-Mart in downtown Manhattan or San Francisco proper).”



## Restaurant responses to entry; Schiff, Cosman, Dai, JUE 2023

In “Delivery in the city” (2023) we were interested in evaluating theories of competition among firms with differentiated products

Classic spatial competition models (ex: Hotelling) suggest firms compete strategically, but only with rivals whose products are most similar (which included geographic distance)

On the other hand, monopolistic competition models (CES and others) suggest firms are always differentiated enough that there is no strategic competition, but rather firms compete for market share with the rest of the market (aggregate)

To assess these competing theories, we assembled a panel (unbalanced) of 550,000 restaurant *menus* from New York City restaurants over 68 consecutive weeks

Our basic strategy was to compare the prices and products on a restaurant's menu, before and after it received a new competitor within a “close” distance

## Restaurant entry is not random

The identification challenge is that entry is not random and therefore we could not simply compare restaurants with new competition to those without

(b) Demographic attributes

(a) Menu attributes			(b) Demographic attributes		
	Menu stats			t-tests	N
	t-tests	N			
item count	-14.43***	88115	age2529	0.023***	88476
mean item price	0.17**	88115	age3039	0.027***	88476
median item price	0.21***	88115	age7079	-0.003***	88476
p25 item price	0.13***	88115	racewhite	0.087***	88476
p95 item price	0.00	88115	raceblack	-0.053***	88476
stars	0.06*	85202	hhfamily	-0.086***	88476
review count	40.87***	79003	hhmarried	-0.038***	88476
order rating	0.71***	86252	educdegree	0.118***	88476
food rating	0.44*	86252	poverty	-0.023***	88476
delivery rating	1.23***	86252	income100150	0.008***	88476
			income150200	0.008***	88476
			unitdetached	-0.064***	88476
			competitors 500m	16.107***	81877

Tests difference between treated and control.

## Modeling entry

Our main identification strategy was to match existing restaurants with equal likelihood of receiving new competition, and then compare these matched restaurants before and after one received entry (matching diff-in-diff)

But how to model entry? Is it a choice made by a fixed number of entrants? Or is it a more of a statistical process where the count varies?

We modeled entry as a Poisson process (statistical) where the count of entrants varied with the underlying characteristics of small neighborhoods (measured with both areal—census tracts—and continuous variables, such as distance to a subway)

We then matched restaurants based on the predicted count of entrants within 500m (baseline) over a given time period

## Thinking about location-based treatments

When treatment is made by one or a small number of agents deciding on a location, then modeling treatment as a choice problem may be appropriate

- Ex: Walmart locations (Jia 2008, Holmes 2011), new factory location (Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010)

For cases with many agents making independent choices, or when treatment isn't the outcome of a choice, then a statistical model makes more sense

- Ex: large numbers of entrants, home foreclosures, crime, pollution sources, Covid cases

An important difference between these two approaches is that with choice models the number of treatments is fixed: the researcher is modeling which location is treated, not whether there is a treatment

With the statistical approach the total number of treated locations is also a random variable

## Aside: discrete choice models, Poisson process

Count data is usually modeled Poisson while choice data uses discrete choice models (ex: conditional logit)

Great article by Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011) showing relation between these models and important differences

Conditional logit models and Poisson models have the same likelihood function (when regressors are only location specific, not characteristics of choice-maker)

Thus, we can actually estimate logit models with a large number of choices quite quickly using Poisson (Guimaraes, Figueirido, and Woodward 2003)

However, models are quite different in predictions: discrete choice models predict exact number of choices made, but Poisson predicted counts are variable (and can differ from actual observed)

*Note:* usually model treatment discretely at the region level because most covariates come from areal data (ex: census tracts); it is possible to model treatment in continuous space (points), but unusual to have continuous predictors

## Back to restaurants: using our entry model

With our poisson entry model, we then matched followed the propensity score literature to trim the sample and run balance tests of restaurant and area characteristics


We then ran event studies and two-way fixed effect models comparing treated and matched control restaurants, before and after treated faced entry

In our baseline specification, we looked at entry within 500m, but we also tested many other entry distances


Note that in our study, changing distance changes treatment—restaurants facing a single new entrant within 500m are quite different than those facing one within 1500m—and so we matched separately for each distance

Result: **no effect** of entry on prices or products! Coefficients all very close to zero, statistically insignificant.

## Results 1: Event Study Plots




Median price




Item count

Plots show results for restaurants facing a single entrant over a 24 week period. We exclude three periods before entry to avoid including any anticipatory responses. Average median item price is \$8.62, average item count is 124.4.

## Results 2: Different spatial distances



Median price




Item count

Plots show TWFE estimates results for different treatment distances (max distance to entrant) for restaurants facing a single entrant over a 24 week period.



## Results 3: Prices do change, but in same way for treated and control



Plot shows within restaurant ( $r$ ) estimates of  $Y_{rt} = \beta * weeks_{rt} + \eta_r + \epsilon_{rt}$ , where  $Y_{rt}$  is a price percentile (ex: 10th percentile of menu)  $t$  weeks after first observation of  $r$ .

## Alternative explanation: strategic entry?

Finding no response was surprising and despite a large battery of robustness checks, people were still skeptical that there was no effect

Our entry model predicts the count of entrants, but does *not* differentiate between types of entrants (cuisine, price, etc...)

We often received the comment that our results could be explained by strategic entry: entrants intentionally chose locations where existing restaurants had different menus and would not be competitors (ex: Italian restaurants locate away from other Italian restaurants)

How to test this?

Could we simply compare the share of nearby restaurants that have the same cuisine (ex: Italian-Italian) to the share of different cuisine restaurants to that cuisine (ex: non-Italian to Italian)?

## Measuring location patterns

There is a very developed literature in spatial statistics focused on concentration measures for areal data (Getis and Ord 1992, Ord and Getis 1995) and point data (Diggle 2013); also see [online notes by Tony Smith](#) (2014)

- For examples in urban economics, see (Ellison and Glaeser 1997, Duranton and Overman 2005, Billings and Johnson 2012, Dai and Schiff 2023)

Key messages from literature is importance of null distribution—to which spatial distribution should one compare?


We used the observed location of entrants as our null and then randomly reshuffled which entrants are assigned to which location (“permutation test”—permute the restaurant identities)

This captures the idea that restaurant location choices are limited by many factors and thus using actual entrant locations ensures plausible counterfactuals

We then compared the similarity of entrants menus with nearby incumbents to our counterfactual location distributions (10,000 random permutations)

## Restaurants locate *closer* to similar restaurants

We found that similar restaurants are actually more likely to co-locate than if they were simply assigned random locations from the set of entrant locations



Greater menu distance means menus are less alike

# Concluding thoughts

## Summary

Availability of spatial data has increased tremendously and researchers increasingly use geography-based identification strategies

The standard of rigor for these strategies is also increasing and we can improve upon vague statements about “close controls” or “decaying distance effects”

Instead, we can often non-parametrically estimate and plot the shape of distance effects

We can formally state the identification assumption, and by thinking about treatment assignment, show evidence in support of this assumption (ex: BRT-type balance tests)

Moreover, often we can model location-based treatments using choice models (ex: logit) or statistical processes (ex: poisson), and use model-based treatment assignment for identification

## Final thought

In (Schiff, Cosman, and Dai 2023) we focused on cases where an existing restaurant received one (or a few) new entrants within a fixed time period (minimum of 16 weeks)

This allowed us to compare these restaurants with others that had no entry over the same period, thus cleanly separating treated and control

However, in New York City there are many places where existing restaurants face new entry *every month!*

There is no way use a treatment/control framework for these cases, yet these are important parts of the New York City restaurant market.

Instead, to estimate competitive effects one needs to explicitly model when and how restaurants adjust menus and then use the data to test this model.

How can we estimate a structural model of competition where space is important?

Ask 王子 and 黄子彬!

Thanks!



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